It is not enough to ask when the system will be back
Cybersecurity discussions usually focus on preventing intrusion, on permissions, on backups, and on disaster recovery.
All of that is essential. An operations manager also needs an answer to a different question: what can the organization keep doing until the fault is over?
A system can be restored within a few hours and a full distribution day can still be lost. It is enough that tasks cannot be released, information cannot come back from the drivers, or delivery records cannot be completed.
A technology recovery plan therefore needs to sit alongside an operational work plan. Not every activity has to continue as usual, but it should be clear in advance which essential processes can still run under limited conditions.
What actually needs to keep working?
Suppose the central planning system is unavailable for four hours.
If the morning routes are already prepared, the first question is whether that information is available without access to the central system.
The second question is what happens in the field. Can drivers see the tasks they have already received, record deliveries, and keep that information until communications return?
The third question is the rest of the day. Who handles customers that ask to change a delivery time? How are exceptions recorded? And how do you avoid the same shipment being handled twice after the system returns?
The answers depend on the system's capabilities and on the processes the organization defined in advance. Working without a connection, for example, requires the relevant information to be available on the device and a defined way to synchronize it later.
If a cyber incident is suspected, continued work also has to follow the information-security team's instructions. Not every fallback is safe to use in every scenario.
When a computer fault stops the warehouse
Logistics systems no longer operate separately from one another.
Orders arrive from the ERP, inventory is managed in a WMS, delivery routes are planned in a TMS, and execution is recorded in the drivers' apps.
In some organizations, information systems are also connected to physical warehouse equipment, such as conveyors and automated storage systems.
This is where OT matters: operational technology that monitors or runs physical equipment and processes. Not every logistics system is an OT system, but the link between IT and operational equipment creates a dependency that has to be taken into account.
When one component is unavailable, the effect can reach the warehouse, the loading dock, and the distribution operation quickly.
That is why it is not enough to check whether each system has a backup. The question is also what happens to the business process when the link between the systems is cut.
A field example: when the cellular network went down
In December 2025, a widespread fault hit the Partner network and also affected some HOT Mobile customers. Users across the country experienced disruptions to cellular and internet service.
Source: Ynet report on the Partner network outage
One of our customers at WEBLET was affected as well. Continuous contact with the drivers was disrupted, but the distribution operation had been prepared for a scenario in which communication is unavailable, so the work did not stop.
When communications returned, the connection to the central system returned as well.
What mattered to me in this case was not only how the fault was handled while it was happening, but that the preparation had been done in advance.
Even an advanced system cannot prevent a fault in an external cellular network. It can be part of an operation designed to cope with periods when communication is not continuously available.
What can be learned from the cyberattack on Norsk Hydro?
In March 2019, the Norwegian aluminum company Norsk Hydro was hit by a wide-ranging cyberattack that affected its operations around the world.
The company had to isolate systems and move parts of its activity to manual processes. Some plants continued to produce almost as usual, while others saw significant disruption.
In its reports, the company described how activity continued through fallback procedures and intensive manual work, alongside the restoration of the computer systems.
Source: Norsk Hydro's update on the cyberattack
The case shows two things. A fallback plan does not guarantee that all activity continues without impact. And the difference between a full shutdown and partial continued work can be very significant for the business.
The lesson for logistics managers is the same: it is not enough to know who is responsible for bringing the server back. Someone also has to be responsible for distribution continuing while the server is unavailable.
Running a connected distribution operation?
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Have you checked what happens when the system is unavailable?
One way to find the gaps is a simple exercise.
Take a typical working day and assume a central system is unavailable for several hours. Then check what happens at each step: receiving orders, preparing routes, loading, drivers leaving, delivery, and documentation.
It should be clear who is authorized to switch to fallback work, which information must be available, and what the conditions are for returning to normal operations.
It is also worth checking how many tasks were completed, how many deliveries were postponed, and which actions had to be completed after the system recovered.
That makes dependencies visible that are easy to miss on an ordinary working day.
The bottom line
The more digital and connected a distribution operation becomes, the more important it is to know what happens when the connection is cut.
Backups and disaster recovery are part of the answer. The other part is the organization's ability to keep providing service, even in a limited way, without losing control of the information or of the activity in the field.
The question a distribution manager needs to ask is not only when the system will be working again, but what will happen to the customers until then.
Further reading: מתקפות סייבר על שרשרת האספקה והמבחן האמיתי של מערך ההפצה (original article in Hebrew by Irit Lotan, published on People & Computers).
